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#### The resolution demands advocacy of a federal policy

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action to bolster economic development between countries

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The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential.

#### First is limits --- Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis --- that’s key to decision-making

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Second is fairness --- what the aff said was not fair to the negative --- we have been excluded --- vote against the aff for not caring about capable opponents, key to success of ideas

**Hatab 2**, Prof of Philosophy @ Old Dominion University, (Lawrence J., The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants**.** [25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT25) In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. [26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT26) An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights**,** not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.

#### Third is switch side debate— political agonism where the negative can respond is the most intellectually effective way to overcome moral hazards and make decisions-- process is more important than substance.

**Gutmann 96** Amy Gutmann , is the president of Penn and former prof @ Princeton, AND Dennis Thompson is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard University, Democracy and Disagreement, 1996 , pp 1

Of the challenges that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life . Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy . The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex . Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of deliberation that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation-the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics . We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy . Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribution to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall possible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy prescribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies discussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and non deliberative disagreement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken . (The abortion example-to which we often return in the book-is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, aboutapolicy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement , and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practicalpolitics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection , or between the application of eachin the nonideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where thelogical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect alwaysto prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in democratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already' pert of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies andprocess that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by whichcitizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Fourth is self-reflexivity—policy debate fosters a willingness to re-examine and reform ideals—solves authoritarianism. It’s the only portable skill—turning the case.

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** [Austin J. and David L., Professors at John Carroll University and University of Miami Respectively, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making”, Twelth Edition, 2008]

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations’s resolutions. Debate about a possible military action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its “Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis,” knowledge and “truth” are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California’s requirement states: Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly competitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: ■ raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; ■ gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; ■ thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequences; and ■ communicates effectively with others in figuring out solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking “entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism.”1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves the thinking of those involved.2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a comprehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, “The debate–critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof favoring a positive debate–critical thinking relationship.”3 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Our model of debate is process, not product – decision-making is learned in a safe space of competing thought experiments

**Hanghoj 08** Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

## 1NC

#### We resolve to think the Cuban freedom fighter. Discourse of terrorism dominates the debate sphere

**Bartolucci 10Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, Bradford, UK** (Valentia. “Critical Studies on Terrorism” pg. # . Routledge. 26 May 2010. Academia. http://www.academia.edu/595081/Analysing\_elite\_discourse\_on\_terrorism)//JuneC//

‘Terrorism’ is a ubiquitous discourse with diffuse effects on many aspects of the publicand private lives of individuals, and it conditions many dimensions of contemporary life.¶ 1¶ The discourse on terrorism, its associated narratives and interlinked discourses, is articu-lated within academic, political, media, and cultural productions and is widely present indaily conversations and political debates. It has become so pervasive as to be found in popular jokes, designs for tattoos, novels, children books, and television programmes(Croft 2006). The presumed objectivity of the discourse, facilitated by the media represen-tation of the collapse of the Twin Towers ‘live’, facilitates an impression of impartial truthtowards which there is no room for discussion. The success of the discourse on terrorismis illustrated by the extent of its hegemony in public debates. Certainly, a discourse isnever completely hegemonic and voices of dissent always exist. In the case of the dis-course on terrorism, however, for a series of reasons starting from its immoral and ‘taboo’connotations, such dissent has been slow to emerge. Although loaded with assumptions,cultural biases, and moral charges, ‘terrorism’ is used uncritically and unreflectively withfar-reaching consequences. Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of such adiscourse, given its appropriation to justify military interventions and stricter security con-trols, among others actions.What is striking when approaching this discourse is its extraordinary level of consistencyamong different genres, spaces and times.The same set of words and linguistic constructionsis used, reproduced again and again, and finally naturalised. It becomes common-sense.Indeed, to ‘understand’ the events of 11 September 2001 as ‘terrorism’ becomes so evident,so clear, so true that the fact of putting it under discussion is unthinkable. In the words of¶ Zulaika and Douglass (1996), ‘Terrorism is so “real” that it requires no frame, so “true” thatno interpretation is necessary, so “concrete” that no meaning need to be inferred’ (p. 5).The English-speaking academic literature on terrorism is extremely rich,¶ 2¶ and literaturefocusing on counter-terrorism issues is also extensive.¶ 3¶ However, critical analyses are rare,and apart from few notable exceptions (see George 1991, Rogers 2007, Zulaika and Douglass1996, and the CTS scholars) analyses from the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) scholars tendconsistently to reproduce the same conceptualisations and understanding of terrorism briefly presented below. Similarly, language or discourse-based analyses of terrorism and counter-terrorism, while growing, remain few.¶ 4¶ The defining work on the discourse of terrorismremains¶ Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism¶ (Zulaika and Doug-lass 1996), with the work of Jackson (2005, 2007a,b,c) further opening this space of analysis.This paper is informed by an emerging new avenue of research in terrorism studiesthat goes under the name of CTS composed of a growing number of scholars. CTS schol-ars acknowledge a number of conceptual, methodological, and epistemological problemsaffecting mainstream terrorism studies (Jackson 2007b). Attention is drawn toward thefailure of mainstream terrorism studies to develop rigorous theories, its over-reliance onsecondary data, its unwarranted assumptions (such as the ‘exceptional’ character of ‘new’terrorism) which obscure debate, and the failure to appreciate cultural–ideological biasesin a field dominated by a ‘Western’ view. Moreover, it refuses to treat ‘terrorism’ as anontologically stable and objective phenomenon that can be uncritically approached.Rather, the same notion of ‘terrorism’ is put under a critical analysis and the consequencesof its use are scrutinised. The objectification of ‘terrorism’ is contested, together with thetendency of reinforcing and reproducing many of the dominant ‘myths’ about it. Thus,attention to the discursive foundations which make terrorism studies possible in the first place is deemed necessary by CTS scholars.CDA seems to be an ideal framework to address the importance of analysing the ter-rorism discourse and its implications. It is a research agenda aimed both at providing ananalysis of discourses and to discerning connections between language and other elementsin social life that are often opaque (Fairclough 2003). For CDA, there is a dialectical rela-tionship between discourses and social structures: language is seen as a social practice anddiscourse as contributing to the construction of the social word. At the same time, dis-courses are seen as constituted by other social practices (Fairclough and Wodak 1997).CDA sees discourses not as neutral ways of describing the world, but as ways of reproduc-ing or challenging relations of power and dominance in society. Indeed, particular atten-tion is devoted to the relation between language and power (Wodak and de Cillia 1997).Operationally, CDA complements the linguistic analysis of discursive texts with an inter-disciplinary approach directed at the deconstruction of the whole socio-political and his-torical contexts in which discourses are embedded (Fairclough 1992).The analytical part of this article is based on a textual analysis of data collected from policy documents and statements and twelve interviews with European diplomatic offi-cials and Moroccan government representatives, as well as one academic and one reli-gious leader. Access to official documents and information on government practices hasoften proved difficult. This difficulty reflects and reproduces the securitisation of Islam-ism, radicalism, and terrorism in Morocco. Given its sensitive nature, many institutionshave no interest in releasing documents or information on ‘terrorism’ and related issues.These problems were partially overcome by using contacts developed when workingclosely with governmental officials for a period of two years. Primary texts are reported asthey were actually presented, without any correction or modification, barring the use of text highlighting to drawn out the nature of the analysis undertaken.¶

#### Social Discourse has made the orthodox view of terrorism common sense further pushing “the labeled” into violence and exclusion

Nimmer ‘7, Livio. Master Student at University of Tartu. [“DE-CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE TERRORISM DISCOURSE: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW” www.ksk.edu.ee/wp.../KVUOA\_Toimetised\_14\_10\_livio\_nimmer.pdf ‎ ]//SKX

“Why do they hate us?”” was the questions many were asking in the West, and particularly in US, after the attacks of 9/11. Soon afterward, the consen- sus was, at first, that it must be because of the failure of the Arab world to come to terms with modernity. As put by one professor of US National War College, the root cause for the anger towards the West was the historic failure of the Arab world to embrace the achievements of modernity: democracy, capitalism and science.8 Huntingtoinian prophecy had fulfilled itself.9 A simi- lar but more generalized idea was aptly put forward by US president George W. Bush.10 The moral condemnation of the 9/11 terrorist acts was unequivo- cal in the US. In the post 9/11 public discourse now emerged a dominant understanding that word terrorism designated something inherently evil and morally wrong. It is often argued that terrorism is immoral at all times in all places, and that terrorism is essentially always the same irrespective of the context it emerges from. The consequence of the 9/11 is that the question of ““terrorism”” is seen in rigid, morally absolute categories. One must condemn terrorism, or it is clear that one embraces it. In the years following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, in public discourse, the conceptualization of terrorism has taken a specific ““common sense”” form. There is a general assumption that only one and universal way of con- ceptualizing terrorism exists. This view has become dominant in western thought. I will call it the orthodox view of terrorism. Over the years the ortho- dox view of terrorism has shaped both –– public discourse and policy –– mak- ing it perceived as objective and universal. Yet contrary to this mainstream view there are other ways to conceptualize terrorism. What we classify as terrorism, and who we label as terrorists depends largely on the point of view from which we approach the question. After the attacks on the World Trade Center –– but also in response to some earlier attacks –– a vivid but very oversimplified conventional wisdom has developed about contemporary terrorism that portrays this threat as both new and unfamiliar.11 In orthodox view, terrorism is broadly defined as the use of violence by non-state actors against innocent non-combatants. Even though there are probably as many definitions of terrorism as there are authors writing about the subject, generally the orthodox view tends to mirror definitions proposed by the US Department of State and US Department of Defense. The US Department of State definition states: ““the term terrorism means pre- meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience””. The Department of State definition has been in use since 1983 and the US Department of Defense has expanded on this with a more recent definition, according to which terrorism is ““The unlawful use of –– or threatened use of –– force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives””.12 There is a latent presumption in both definitions that it is only non-state actors who can commit acts of terrorism. The latter one also introduces religion and the vague ““ideological objectives”” as motivators for terrorism. The notion ““ideological objectives”” is specifically vague and could facilitate a wide range of possible interpretations of motives that cause social actors to commit acts of violence. The orthodox view describes modern terrorist’’s mentality as growing from absolutist and religiously motivated worldview which sees everything in binary categories: either-or, good or evil, us or them. That is why there is no possible way to come to a rational compromise or no possibility of dialogue or mutual bargaining between the sides. Peaceful and civilized dialogue and persuasion of terrorists is not possible because of their absolutist and rigid principles. Thus the proposed solution to deal with the problems that terrorism presents is to implement rigid and absolutist countermeasures against those who are classified as terrorists. Those who commit terrorist acts are, accord- ing to orthodox view, enemies of the democratic process and civilized dis- course itself. Terrorists are described as inherently evil and uncivilized.13 In the orthodox view terrorist mentality is usually portrayed as unwarrantably radical and irrational in its core; terrorists are simply nihilists who are driven by abstract ““cruelty and hate, the shedding of all moral restraints, the great rage about everything and nothing in particular, the joy generated by killing and destruction””14. Terrorist acts are described as irrational not only because of their non- sensible motives, but also because their acts are directed against a tendency of rational human beings to strive for order and stability. As terrorists intimidate and destabilize societies by disseminating fear, uncertainty, insecurity and chaos they are described as enemies of the principle of order itself. Their tactics rely on generating shock, fear and surprise in societies, which strive for order and predictability, by indiscriminately attacking innocents. Moreover, according to the orthodox view, modern terrorists show a special kind merci- lessness by using any means possible –– including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction –– to advance their agenda against victimized societies. In the orthodox view the terrorist threat is often portrayed as an amorphous and fluid menace, and terrorists as an invisible a-spatial enemy. Terrorist are stateless and without territory, operating in the form of terrorist networks that transcend the borders of states.15

## Case

#### ontology should be ignored

Owen 2

David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate.

# 2NC

## Framework

Pragmatic political action to prevent nuclear war is a prerequisite to ontological investigations

Santoni 85 - Maria Theresa Barney Chair Emeritus of Philosophy at Denison University (Ronald, “Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives” p 156-157)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth.  But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide.  In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the ams race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence.  Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.”  Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)?  Is this all we can do?  Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?”  Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift?  Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?”  In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”?  Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.”  He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.”  I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur.  (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.)  Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard.  In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation.  The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved will ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

#### “Resolved” is legislative

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### 2. Its better than ignoring the state --- their framework is the political equivalent of burying your head in the sand --- they cede the political.

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ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy.

There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making.

For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge.

Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics.

Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251).

National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts.

In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences.

The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality.

Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray.

For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

# 1NR

#### **Terrorism discourse creates a constant state of fear, panic, and anxiety that intensifies negative/irrational political action**

Nimmer ‘7, Livio. Master Student at University of Tartu. [“DE-CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE TERRORISM DISCOURSE: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW” www.ksk.edu.ee/wp.../KVUOA\_Toimetised\_14\_10\_livio\_nimmer.pdf ‎ ]//SKX

The consequence of de-contextualisation in the terrorism discourse is that when the enemy is constructed as an abstract evil it creates an atmosphere of public anxiety and fear. For example during the eight years of the US Home- land Security Advisory System –– a five-color scheme that indicated the ter- rorist threat in the US –– it was mostly on levels yellow or orange, fluctuating between high and elevated levels of threat. It was never lowered to blue or green.46 By de-contextualization an atemporal and omnipresent state of emer- gency is created that manufactures need to be ever vigilant, and implement ever widening scope of terrorism countermeasures like electronic surveil- lance, wiretapping, personal information harvesting, border searches and racial profiling.47 The image of an invisible and aspatial enemy that poses an omnipresent threat opens up the possibility of resolving arbitrarily the problem of nam- ing the enemy. In the state of public fear scapegoating as enemies those who look different, who have alternative political views, or who constitute mar- ginalized groups in society, could become a normal and tolerated practice. In the state of anxiety the practice of labelling and scapegoating different social actors becomes the means for satisfying certain socialand psychologi- cal needs, like the need to assign blame or the need to reduce the psychic discomfort of society.48 There is a danger that terrorism discourse leads to persecution of political dissent and to the destruction of open civil society. The war on terrorism is not limited to violent extremism, but is fought against ““extremist ideology”” in general. This ““extremist ideology”” is shared alike by those who commit acts of violence and those who are called ““non-violent extremists””.49 When terrorist motives are de-contextualized, those who are blamed for supporting terrorists or sharing a terrorist philosophy are also classified under a category of ““terrorist””.50 It is not only certain actions but also certain ways of thinking that are delegitimatized in the terrorism discourse. There is a growing body of evidence that political activists, animal rights protesters, anti-globalism protesters, liberals, academics, and curiously even photographers are silenced and persecuted under the legislation that has proliferated as a consequence of terrorism discourse.51 The de-contextualization of the enemy leads to the legislation that in broad sweeps makes a large variety of political expression a terrorism related offense. In the US Patriot Act, for example, a new concept of domestic terrorism is coined, that is defined as ““acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws”” if they ““appear to be intended ... to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion””52. Such vaguely defined criteria make it possible to classify almost any kind of politi- cal expression as terrorism. A similar problem is present in the inclusion of ideological and religious motives in official definitions of terrorism. Commu- nicatingone’’s political or religious views is part of normal democratic public life. But by making it possible to classify advancing ones religious or political views, and influencing government politics as terrorism-related crime, gov- ernments could limit legitimate political action as they see fit. Itis not only radical forms of political actions like property damage or civil disobedience that are vilified, but in a state of public fear, any critique of dominant power is dampened.

#### AND, deconstructing discourse must come first – it is prerequisite to ontology

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According to former Vice President of the U.S., Richard Cheney, the West is facing terrorists who are “willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill millions of others” (cited in Jackson, 2007, Politics of Fear, 180). Sadly, Mr. Cheney is not the only one espousing this fearful rhetoric and since September 11, 2001, the idea that there is a new terrorism, more terrible and deadly than ever before, has become part of the standard discourse. However, through this paper I have attempted to show that not only is there is actually nothing new about contemporary terrorism but that the evidence disputes the accuracy of the characteristics applied to the new terrorism. It is crucial that the public be willing to critically examine what is behind the discourse, because the discourse of the WoT has had a profoundly negative impact on the world in the last ten years. Perhaps if people were able to understand that we are not dealing with anything different from what we have been dealing with for hundreds of years and that the statistics simply do not support the claims made about the dangers and risk of terrorism, the field would be opened for new conversations about security – conversations that address broader security concerns, do not involve trillion dollar budgets and that move us toward potentially more efficacious solutions.

However, this is a lofty undertaking precisely because of the widespread acceptance and functionality of the terrorism discourse in western society. I argue that the discourse serves four key purposes for the political elites and that it is thoroughly integrated into the psychology of both individuals and societies through historical context; the representation and reinforcement of the media and the emptiness of life in modern, neoliberal culture. All of these elements add up to make mainstream discourse something that is part and parcel of contemporary society. Powerful structures are in place to disseminate the discourse and to reinforce it so thoroughly that it becomes truth. I do not have any answers as to how to overcome this issue, however, deconstructing the discourse, by those who recognize it, is a significant first step.

#### The use and definition of the word of terrorist/terrorism has been corrupted, changed to fit the discourse of the current politics rather than actions of the being. Post-9/11/2001 American popular politics proves they cannot reappropriate the term.

Nimmer ‘7, Livio. Master Student at University of Tartu. [“DE-CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE TERRORISM DISCOURSE: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW” www.ksk.edu.ee/wp.../KVUOA\_Toimetised\_14\_10\_livio\_nimmer.pdf ‎ ]//SKX

After the terrorist acts of 9/11 the word “terrorism” has been much exploited by politicians. It has become a primary term in central narratives of Western culture like the terms ““freedom”” and ““democracy””.1 At the same time it is still impossible to define what exactly is meant by this word. There is no official and agreed definition that would accurately describe the phenomena that it designates. Over the years ““terrorism”” has changed the meaning many times and all attempts to come to a fixed definition have come to no avail. Moreo- ver, it seems that post 9/11 the meaning of the term has become even more abstract and elusive. In the political discourse it has been used interchangeably with more general ““terror””. 2 Various words have been used to describe those who commit acts of terrorism. They are radicals, fundamentalists, evil madmen, the enemies of democracy, enemies of civilization, enemies of freedom, insur- gents, tyrants, murderers, criminals and killers who operate in shadowy net- works. The definition of who is a terrorist has become as elusive as the term terrorism. As these vague categories are used in public discourse it induces a climate of fear and anxiety among Western populations. This climate of fear has had a profound effect on the public discourse, policy and civil liber- ties. Then the aims of terrorists have become a strategy of scapegoating and attaching negative labels to political dissidents, activists and random people in the name of security and avoidance of radicalization. As the recent leak of secret US Military documents dubbed theGuan- tánamo Bay files3 shows, the criteria used to measure who were considered to be terrorists were quite unclear.Guantánamo Bay documents show that in many cases criteria had been arbitrarily defined by military and intelligence institutions. Among those who were captured and imprisoned were children, mentally ill persons, and elderly pensioners, against whom there was no evi- dence that they were extremists or had committed any terrorist acts.4 The reasons for capture varied, and were often based on what a law specialist and prisoners rights campaigner Clive Stafford Smith has described as extraordi- narily thin evidence.5 People were detained and sent to prison based on vague false accusations, for their expected intelligence value, or barely on prejudice of officials. Even wearing a cheap Casio watch could mark one as terrorist.6

<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.25.02.html>; George W. Bush. Update in the War on Terror. Washington, DC, September 7, 2003 <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/ speeches/09.07.03.html>. 3 Guardian editor David Leigh writes: ““A number of other documents in the cache spell out guidelines for interrogating and deciding the fate of detainees. One, the ‘‘JTF-GTMO matrix of threat indicators’’ details the ‘‘indicators’’ which should be used to ‘‘determine a detainee’’s capabilities and intentions to pose a terrorist threat if the detainee were given the opportu- nity.’’ Another provides a matrix for deciding whether a prisoner should be held or released.”” David Leigh. What are the Guantánamo Bay files? Understanding the prisoner dossiers. –– The Guardian, Monday, April 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/25/ what-are-guantanamo-files-explained>. 4 James Ball. Guantánamo Bay files: Children and senile old men among detainees. –– The Guardian, Monday, April 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/25/ guantanamo-files-children-old-men?intcmp=239>. 5 Clive Stafford Smith. Guantánamo Bay files: ‘‘The vast majority were not extremists’’. –– The Guardian, Monday, April 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/apr/25/ guantanamo-bay-files-reprieve-video?intcmp=239>. 6 JTF-GTMO Matrix of Threat Indicators, published in Guantánamo files: How interro- gators were told to spot al-Qaida and Taliban members. –– The Guardian, Monday, April 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/apr/25/guantanamo-files-interro- gators-al-qaida-taliban#the-sign-of-al-qaida>. The original document states: ““The possession of a Casio F-91W model watch and the silver-color version of this model, the A159W, is

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